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READING THE EVIDENTIARY VOID 
The Body at the Scene of Writing 
Trish Luker
* 
In Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000), a form of consent with the purported 
thumbprint of Topsy Kundrilba was found to offer sufficiently persuasive 
evidence to reject the claim of forcible removal of an Indigenous child. In this 
landmark action in relation to the Stolen Generations, the thumbprint was 
imbued with the status of a signature which was interpreted as indicating a 
mothers informed consent to the removal of her son. Drawing on Derridas 
concept of iterability, I suggest that the thumbprint cannot be read as a 
signature, and propose an alternative deconstructive reading. I argue that the 
form of consent exemplifies colonial documentary practices which were 
implemented in an attempt to make Indigenous subjects legible and to 
produce subjectivity which conformed to normative white patriarchal order.   
In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, 
iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach from the present and singular 
intention of its production.1 
[A person’s fingerprint] is not testimony about his body, but his body itself.2 
Introduction 
On 13 February 2008, the recently elected new prime minister of Australia, Kevin 
Rudd, delivered the National Apology to the Stolen Generations on behalf of the 
Australian Parliament. In this, the inaugural motion of the new parliament, Rudd 
deployed the well-known trope of the book of history, describing the removal of 
Indigenous children as ‘this blemished chapter on our nation’s history’ and 
committing the parliament to ‘turn a new page in Australia’s history by righting the 
wrongs of the past’, asserting that in offering the apology as the first step in healing, 
‘this new page in the history of our great continent can now be written’.3  
History books have not always served Australian Indigenous people well when 
making legal claims for injustice. Eight years earlier, on 11 August 2000, Justice 
O’Loughlin of the Federal Court of Australia handed down his decision in the 
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1 Derrida (1982), p 328. 
2  Wigmore (1923), p 874. 
3  Rudd (2008), p 167. 
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landmark case taken by members of the Stolen Generations, Lorna Cubillo and 
Kwementyay Gunner.4 Cubillo and Gunner argued that the Commonwealth 
government was vicariously liable for their removals from their families and 
communities as children and their subsequent detentions in the Retta Dixon Home 
and St Mary’s Hostel in the Northern Territory during the 1940s and 1950s.  
In Cubillo, Justice O’Loughlin repeatedly highlighted the overriding 
difficulties the case presented due to the ‘incompleteness’ of the history and the 
lack of documentary evidence. In relation to the removal of Lorna Cubillo and the 
other children from Phillip Creek in the Northern Territory, he stated that 
‘curiously, neither the applicants nor the respondent could produce a single 
document in respect of that removal’,5 that ‘people are dead and documents, if they 
ever existed, have been lost’.6 He concluded, however, that: ‘The position 
concerning Mr Gunner is quite different. In his case, there were several pieces of 
documentary evidence concerning his leaving Utopia and going to St Mary’s.’7 In 
particular, O’Loughlin J identified a ‘form of consent by a parent’8 with the 
purported thumbprint of Gunner’s mother, Topsy Kundrilba. Justice O’Loughlin 
regarded this form as indicating that Kundrilba had requested that her son be 
removed to St Mary’s Hostel, and the presence of a thumbprint or fingerprint on the 
form was read as an indication of her intention. This, now infamous, exhibit was 
crucial to O’Loughlin J’s decision in relation to Gunner’s claim.9 It functioned to 
suggest that Gunner’s mother consented to his removal to St Mary’s Hostel. While 
the judge determined that it was not possible to make findings of fact about the 
circumstances of the removal of Gunner from Utopia Station to St Mary’s Hostel — 
and he accepted Gunner’s claim that he was forcibly removed against his wishes — 
O’Loughlin J nevertheless found the form of consent a sufficiently persuasive 
exhibit that it formed the basis for the court’s rejection of the claim. The text of the 
form is reproduced below: 
                                                           
4  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97. Sadly, in April 2005, Mr Gunner passed 
away. He was a man of courage and dignity, whose struggle, along with Lorna Cubillo, 
in seeking justice for members of the Stolen Generations was of great significance. In 
accordance with Alyawarre and other Central Australian Aboriginal law, I will use 
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5  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 129. 
6  Cubillo v Commonwealth, [2000] FCA 1084, Summary of reasons for judgment, para 
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7  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 488. 
8  Exhibit A21 (Interlocutory)/A73, ‘Form of Consent by a Parent’. The exhibit was 
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9  The judicial interpretation of the thumbprint was highlighted in the media coverage and 
in critical responses, including Watson (2000). For an alternative deconstructive reading 
of the form of consent, see Parsley (2006). 
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FORM OF CONSENT BY A PARENT 
I,  TOPSY KUNDRILBA being a full-blood Aboriginal (female) within the 
meaning of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918–1953 of the Northern Territory, 
and residing at UTOPIA STATION do hereby request the DIRECTOR OF 
NATIVE AFFAIRS to declare my son [KWEMENTYAY] GUNNER aged 
seven (7) years, to be an Aboriginal within the meaning and for the purposes 
of the said Aboriginals Ordinance.  
 
My reasons for requesting this action by the Director of Native Affairs are: 
1. My son is of Part-European blood, his father being a European. 
2. I desire my son to be educated and trained in accordance with accepted 
European standards, to which he is entitled by reason of his caste. 
3. I am unable myself to provide the means by which my son may derive the 
benefits of a standard European education. 
4. By placing my son in the care, custody and control of the Director of 
Native Affairs, the facilities of a standard education will be made 
available to him by admission to St Mary’s Church of England Hostel at 
Alice Springs.  
 
SIGNED of my own free will) TOPSY 
this  day of 1956 Her mark 
 KUNDRILBA 
in the presence of 
 
The form is undated and unwitnessed. It includes the statement ‘signed of my own 
free will this ___ day of _____1956 in the presence of ______’, but the gaps have 
not been filled in. There is a thumbprint or fingerprint with the typed words ‘her’ 
and ‘mark’ on either side, and ‘TOPSY’ and ‘KUNDRILBA’ above and below.  
The exhibit was sourced in the National Archives of Australia. While undated, 
unwitnessed and bearing no official seal or insignia, the form of consent was 
regarded as a public document, making further evidence as to its authenticity 
unnecessary.10 In Cubillo, the form of consent functioned as documentary evidence 
that Topsy Kundrilba had given her informed consent to the removal of her son. 
However, rather than resolving the issue of liability, the exhibit ultimately raised 
more questions than it answered, for how do we know that Kundrilba did consent? 
How, indeed, can we know that the thumbprint is in fact Topsy’s? Can we presume 
to know what she was intending by putting her mark on the form? Do we know 
whether she understood the result of this action? Did she know that she would not 
see her son again until he returned as an adult? Was there coercion? Justice 
O’Loughlin himself acknowledged that many of these questions could not be 
answered. He stated that there was no way of knowing how the contents of the 
document were explained or whether they were explained at all — in which case, he 
asserted, the document would probably be a nullity. On the ‘balance of 
probabilities’, however, O’Loughlin J found that the ‘line of documents’ favoured a 
positive conclusion that Topsy Kundrilba had given her informed consent to her son 
going to St Mary’s. He said: 
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In coming to that conclusion, I am aware that there was no way of knowing whether 
the thumb mark on the ‘Form of Consent’ was Topsy’s; even on the assumption that 
it was, there was no way of knowing whether Topsy understood the contents of the 
document. But it is not beyond the realms of imagination to find that it was possible 
for a dedicated, well-meaning patrol officer to explain to a tribal Aboriginal such as 
Topsy the meaning and effect of the document. I have no mandate to assume that 
Topsy did not apply her thumb or that she, having applied her thumb, did not 
understand the meaning and effect of the document.11 
Justice O’Loughlin identifies the fundamental question which hermeneutics 
attempts to address — that is, how do we understand the past in the present? The 
initial questions provoked by the judge’s reading of the exhibit can be traced to 
Gadamer’s significant contribution to hermeneutics in his concept of temporal 
distance and the challenge presented to communication by our historical 
situatedness, or horizon of understanding.12 There is, in this case, a multiplying of 
hermeneutic contexts which exemplify the challenge to understanding of the 
relationship between text and interpretation. In the imagined first instance, there is 
the context of the unidentified patrol officer and Topsy Kundrilba — a socio-
linguistic situation of incommensurable alterity. Subsequently, there is the 
possibility of circulation of the document to other readers, such as the Director of 
Native Affairs, and its unknown location up until its storage in the National 
Archives. There is the sourcing of the document as an exhibit and its contested 
significance within the trial, and the hermeneutic context of its reception by the 
Federal Court. Of course, there is also now the hermeneutic context here of my, and 
your, interpretation of the document, and that of any other current or future 
analysis.  
In this article, I investigate the form of consent containing the thumbprint as a 
somatechnic site. Pugliese and Stryker have argued that the concept of 
somatechnics offers a framework for analysing the historical and cultural 
contingency of embodiment and subjectivity.13 As such, it is a particularly useful 
conceptual paradigm for interrogating legal constructions of race and the 
hegemonic function of whiteness in the context of colonialism. I argue that the 
exhibit is exemplary of the operation of somatechnics, for not only does it reveal 
the operation of a biotechnology of racial classification, but also, in the thumbprint, 
an embodied presence is materialised. In this way, the thumbprint may be an 
example of a ‘capillary space’ linking the macropolitics of colonial constructions of 
whiteness and the micropolitics of racially inscribed bodies.14 Rather than a 
signature, I will argue that the exhibit demonstrates the operation of historical 
documentary practices of governance which functioned to produce racialised and 
gendered subjectivity. My argument will proceed in three stages. Drawing on 
Austin’s theorisation of speech acts,15 I will first argue that the thumbprint can only 
                                                           
11  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 344. 
12  Gadamer (1975). 
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15  Austin (1962). 
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function as a valid signature if it is read as a performative speech act in which 
intention is communicated. However, as Derrida has demonstrated, a deconstructive 
reading of the function of intention in signification reveals that it is derived from 
the metaphysics of presence, the idea that there is an origin of knowledge from 
which truth can be determined.16 Rather than intention, Derrida posits the concept of 
iterability — the capacity to be repeated in the absence of the addressee — as 
central to interpretation. For Derrida, the concept of iterability incorporates the 
notions of both repetition and alterity.17 Using this framework, I argue that the 
thumbprint fails to conform to the sign of a signature. Nevertheless, the mark and 
the document on which it appears are open to other significant interpretations — 
readings that O’Loughlin J failed to take into account in his judgment. Having 
rejected the juridical interpretation of the thumbprint, I go on to propose an 
alternative somatechnic reading of the exhibit. I argue that the form of consent 
exemplifies colonial documentary practices that were implemented in an attempt to 
make Indigenous subjects legible and to produce subjectivity which conformed to 
normative white patriarchal order.  
Acts of Speech 
In his philosophy of language, Austin makes reference to the signature as a 
performative speech act in terms of its capacity to invoke the ‘“I” who is doing the 
action’ or ‘utterance-origin’. Austin points to the importance of ‘something which 
is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering’, arguing that: 
‘Where there is not, in the verbal formula of the utterance, a reference to the person 
doing the uttering, and so the acting, by means of the pronoun “I” (or by his 
personal name), then in fact he will be “referred to” in one of two ways … In verbal 
utterances, by his being the person who does the uttering’ and ‘In written utterances 
… by his appending his signature’.18 
Using Austin’s analysis, the purported thumbprint of Kundrilba can only 
function as a valid signature on the form if it is read as a performative speech act in 
which intention is communicated. However, hermeneutic problems emerge with 
this framework of speech acts when applied to interpretation of historical 
documents such as that tendered in the trial, in cross-cultural contexts where we are 
unable to verify comprehension. As O’Loughlin J himself acknowledges, it is 
impossible to answer the question of whether and how the issues and concepts of 
the form could be understood by Topsy Kundrilba. He said:  
There was … no way of knowing how the contents of the document were explained 
to Topsy. Perhaps they were not explained at all — in that case the document would 
probably be a nullity. Perhaps they were explained with infinite patience and care — 
                                                           
16  Derrida (1982). 
17  Derrida points out that the link between iterability and alterity inheres in the 
etymological connection between iter, ‘once again’, coming from itara, ‘other’ in 
Sanskrit. 
18  Austin (1962), pp 60–61. 
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in which case the document would become tangible proof of Topsy’s understanding. 
The short answer is that we will never know.19 
But we do know that Kundrilba did not speak English because her son gave 
evidence that, when he returned to his country at Utopia in 1969, he could not talk 
with his mother because he had lost his language and she could not speak English. 
He said: ‘I could never speak that language to make her understand that — to tell 
her stories of where I was taken, where I was locked up. I could not tell her stories 
what had happened to me.’20 However, Gunner’s eyewitness testimony and the 
significance of this highly credible scenario were eclipsed by a document found in 
the historical archive. The privileging of the significance of documentary evidence 
over that of oral testimony was a defining characteristic of the Cubillo judgment 
and clearly exemplified in the interpretation of the form of consent. As I will go on 
to argue, the significance of the exhibit to his decision, the meaning attributed to it, 
was affirmed by O’Loughlin J in the place of what he perceived as an evidentiary 
void. As evidence, it stands in for, or represents, what the law does not know.  
Signs of Intention 
The concept of intention is a key premise in Western thought, where it is regarded 
as the foundation of rational agency. Intention forms the basis of moral 
responsibility and accountability for human action. It therefore fundamentally 
underpins legal discourse. In law, intention is regarded as a ‘mental state’ or frame 
of mind. It is considered a conscious process of premeditation, which motivates 
human subjects and is directly related to the notion of free will. Intention is central 
to the self-determined subject with freedom of choice; this is the same subject who 
is both competent and compellable to give evidence in a trial. Legal processes of 
cross-examination rely on the belief that, as individuals, we may know our own 
intentions — indeed, it cannot be an intention unless we know it, unless it is a 
conscious wish; unconscious desire is not regarded by law as evidence of intention. 
But while individuals can reveal their intention to the court, it cannot be physically 
observed or known; intention is therefore regarded as an epistemological question 
for law.21 Whether or not intention is regarded by a court to have existed in relation 
to an act at the time of the act is determined retrospectively, revealing the 
constructed nature of the juridical concept of intention. As Thornton points out, the 
key to intention in legal discourse is its pragmatic role in construing signification, in 
understanding intendment and therefore in being able to allocate responsibility or 
culpability.22 
In the Cubillo case, the form of consent was central to O’Loughlin J’s decision 
in relation to Gunner. It was taken as evidence of a request by Gunner’s mother that 
he be removed to St Mary’s Hostel. The issue of intent, and therefore of how the 
form is read, is vital to the decision because consent is a complete answer to any 
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21  Naffine et al (2001), p 6. 
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claim for false imprisonment. Robert makes the important point that it removed the 
requirement to invoke the statutory provisions of the Aboriginals Ordinance in 
force at the time, and therefore transfers the responsibility of removal and 
subsequent detention from the state to the mother.23  
What evidence is there that Kundrilba understood the effect applying her 
thumbprint would have? Gunner gave evidence that he was removed from Utopia 
homestead in the morning on a ration day, that he remembers he was crying and 
screaming, that all the other families were present, including his mother, and that a 
lot of people were ‘crying and yelling in Aboriginal language’.24 He said he did not 
know why he was being placed on the back of the khaki-coloured truck by a white 
man in uniform, that he had not been told where he was to be taken or why, and that 
he had not seen anyone in uniform speak to his mother or any other member of his 
family beforehand. He also said that there had been two previous attempts to 
remove him from his family.  
Harry Kitching, the patrol officer identified by O’Loughlin J as probably the 
one who took Gunner, stated in evidence that he spoke with Aboriginal people in 
English, ‘as well as now and again picking up a bit of what they were saying in 
Areyonga’.25 Clearly, he did not speak Kundrilba’s language sufficiently to explain 
the ramifications of the removal of her son from his family and community. He also 
acknowledged that ‘a house girl’ such as Kundrilba would not be able to read and 
write in English. As the relevant patrol officer, Kitching stated that he had the 
discretion to decide whether a child was ‘at risk’ and whether to recommend that 
they be removed, acknowledging that such a decision was premised on the belief 
that placement at an institution in Alice Springs was always in the child’s best 
interests. He claimed, however, that there would be no reason to remove Gunner on 
the basis of neglect, stating: ‘because of his part-Aboriginal background. He was 
still a misfit.’26  
I have argued that the meaning attributed by O’Loughlin J to the thumbprint on 
the form — that is, the potential for intention on the part of Kundrilba — stands in 
the place of what the judge perceived as an evidentiary void. While acknowledging 
that we cannot know the nature of Kundrilba’s intention in placing her mark on the 
form, O’Loughlin J nevertheless attributes to her, transmitted through time and 
space in the mark of her body as signature, the intention that her son be taken away 
to St Mary’s Hostel. In this way, we can see that the notion of intention is a 
juridical construction; it is discursively produced by the law, but attributed to a 
prior event and to an original authorial subject. It is characteristic of positive law to 
seek out causation as a way of attempting to establish a foundation for certainty in 
knowledge.  
                                                           
23  Robert (2001), p 6. 
24  Transcript, 16 August 1999, p 1505. 
25  I will point out that it is my understanding that Areyonga is a place, not a language, 
located in the Pitjantjatjara lands, south-west of Alice Springs. Gunner gave evidence 
that his mother’s group was Anmatyerr. This is at least one of the languages she would 
have spoken. 
26  Transcript, 6 August 1998, p 64. 
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Intention and Iterability 
Deconstruction challenges the primacy attributed to the function of intention in 
communication, and any account of signification that locates meaning in the 
consciousness of the speaking subject. Derrida critiques Western philosophy as 
built upon the ‘metaphysics of presence’ — the belief that there is an origin of 
knowledge from which ‘truth’ can be determined and made present. This is an 
approach to meaning and interpretation based on an understanding that signifying 
systems such as language function like a code to provide transparent access to the 
origin of truth and full meaning in the sign.27 As Derrida meticulously explicates, 
there can be no ‘full and determinate original meaning’ because all signs inevitably 
refer to other signs. There is, according to Derrida, only what he terms différance —
difference and deferment—where ‘the signified can be grasped only as the effect of 
an interpretative or productive process in which interpretants are adduced to delimit 
it’.28 
Derrida discusses the signature in ‘Signature Event Context’,29 in which he 
critiques Austin’s speech act theory. As Derrida points out, Austin attempted to 
develop an account of signification, or the ‘illocutionary force’ of utterances, not by 
reference to an origin of meaning but through an account of the linguistic system in 
which they are produced. Derrida argues that at a certain point in Austin’s analysis 
— the point at which ‘the divided agency of the legal signature emerges’30 — he 
reintroduces the notion of the source of communication. While pointing to the 
deconstructive gesture made by Austin in attempting to ‘free the analysis of the 
performative from the authority of the value of truth, from the opposition 
true/false’,31 Derrida’s critique focuses on the way in which Austin, by privileging 
the significance of the intention of the author of communication in his analysis of 
the performative, ultimately reaffirms the metaphysics of presence.  
Rather than intention, Derrida posits the concept of iterability, the capacity to 
be repeatable in the absence of the addressee, as central to the formation of 
meaning. He argues that what Austin excludes from his analysis of successful 
performatives — that which he regards as anomalous, exceptional, ‘non-serious’ or 
‘infelicitous’ — is actually ‘citation (on the stage, in a poem or in a soliloquy), the 
determined modification of a general citationality — or rather a general iterability 
without which there would not even be a “successful” performative’.32 For Derrida, 
all signs, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written, can be cited and therefore 
can ‘break with every given context and engender infinitely new contexts in an 
absolutely nonsaturable fashion’.33 It is the fact of iterability, in the absence of the 
                                                           
27  Of course, Derrida was not alone in his critique of the privileging of intention in the 
communication of meaning. Intellectual attention to the text and to the function of 
language and discourse, rather than to authorial intention, is characteristic of post-
structuralism generally, and was already present in the work of Barthes and Foucault.  
28  Culler (1975), pp 19–20. 
29  Derrida (1982). 
30  Derrida (1982), p 327. 
31  Derrida (1982), p 322. 
32  Derrida (1982), p 325. 
33  Derrida (1982), p 320. 
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speaker and receiver, which facilitates meaning. Derrida discusses the signature and 
Austin’s attempt to mark it as the performative equivalence of the speaker or 
‘utterance-origin’. A signature is a written mark that is given in the absence of the 
signer; it is generally regarded as attesting to a presence and an intention at a 
particular moment. Derrida argues that, while ‘a written signature implies the actual 
or empirical nonpresence of the signer’, it also ‘marks and retains … the 
transcendental form of nowness’.34  
Derrida’s analysis begs the question of whether the thumbprint is iterable. Can 
it be detached from the present and singular intention of its production? Is it 
recognisable as the signature of Kundrilba? A signature is a written mark that 
reproduces the name — the sign — of the person signing. A signature is literally to 
sign a sign; it is to sign the sign (the name, mark or symbol) of the subject. Each 
time I sign my name, I am meant to reproduce the same sign, otherwise the validity 
of the signature, its authenticity, can be called into question. In order to function as 
a valid sign, a signature must resemble itself. When I am required to sign my name, 
I am commonly asked to provide a form of identification on which my signature 
also appears so that it can be checked against that which I have just signed. My 
signature must imitate itself. Yet for most of us, in signing our name, we must write 
quickly, spontaneously, and not think about the action we are performing. If I 
hesitate or pause for thought when signing my name, or if I feel self-conscious in 
front of another, I may not be able to replicate my own signature and I may feel like 
a forger. A signature may be forged by someone other than the person whose sign it 
is, but this repetition is not considered a valid signature (even if successful in the 
transaction) and can subsequently be revoked. While the name signed in a signature 
may be illegible, it is regarded as the authentic mark of the named individual; it is 
the mark of the individual subject.  
In contrast to my own signature, I would argue that the mark on the form of 
consent does not conform to the model of a signature — it is not the name of the 
author; indeed, it is not even a linguistic form. As O’Loughlin J himself points out, 
there is no way of even knowing if it is the mark of Kundrilba. When I interviewed 
Gunner, he highlighted this failure of the court to authenticate the evidence, 
pointing out that there well may have been other documents, such as at the hospital 
in Alice Springs, on which his mother’s mark could have been recorded. He also 
made the point that there was apparently more than one woman who was known as 
‘Topsy’ living at Utopia at the time,35 highlighting the way that nominal 
individualised identity is often undermined by its own discursive production.  
In a deconstruction of biometric identity signatures that also deploys a 
somatechnic approach to reveal the metaphysics of presence, Pugliese points out 
that a biometric screening such as a fingerprint or eye scan which exactly replicates 
a template does not function as verification because an exact match would be seen 
as possible evidence of fraud. As he elaborates, it is the necessity that a signature is 
                                                           
34  Derrida (1982), p 328. 
35  Interview with Peter Gunner, Utopia community, 28 September 2004. Gunner regarded 
this failure as indicative of a lack of rigour in research methodology for the trial.  
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always already inscribed by Derrida’s différance that destabilises univocal 
conceptualisations of subjective identity on which the technology is premised.36 
Contrary to the use of fingerprints in criminal investigations or in the context 
of biometrics, marks on documents such as the form of consent do not function as 
individual identification. In the trial, there were a number of witnesses who worked 
as patrol officers in the Northern Territory at the time Kundrilba is alleged to have 
placed her mark on the form. Not one was able to provide clear evidence about the 
collection of thumb- or finger-marks in the situation where children were removed 
from their mothers, or for other bureaucratic processes. Overall, the evidence about 
this practice was notably sketchy and inconsistent. This was arguably not a simple 
case of ‘memory loss’ or ‘confusion’, as O’Loughlin J concluded, but rather 
indicative of the fact that, as a practice in the Northern Territory at the time, 
soliciting marks as signatures when children were removed was irregularly 
performed. It appears to have begun in the 1930s, possibly as a response to 
mounting community concern about the practice of child removal and international 
pressure on the government from humanitarian organisations.  
There appears to be more evidence of the use of thumbprints in relation to the 
withholding and ‘management’ of Aboriginal workers’ wages and other 
entitlements. Kidd claims that from 1935 thumbprinting was ‘mandatory for 
dealings on Aboriginal accounts with duplicates held at head office’, but that it was 
known by the authorities to have been easily defrauded by employers and 
protectors, even when handled by the CIB.37 The state’s collection of thumbprints in 
the analogous contexts of stolen children and stolen wages demonstrates the way it 
functioned not as individualised authorisation, but as a technology of governance 
intended to provide a veil of accountability over activities that were recognised at 
the time to be questionable. 
I have argued that to interpret the thumbprint on the form as Kundrilba’s 
signature indicating consent to the removal of Gunner must be contested. The 
retrospective juridical construction of intention is undermined by a deconstructive 
reading that highlights the impossible iterability of the thumbprint, and 
consequently its failure to function legibly as a signature. However, this does not 
exhaust the potential for understanding the exhibit, for there are indeed other 
alternative readings. While the thumbprint cannot meaningfully be interpreted as a 
signature conveying consent, this does not mean that it is devoid of meaning. On 
the contrary, as I will go on to argue, the thumbprint, as a mark of the body 
impressed upon a bureaucratic document, presents an exemplary site for a 
somatechnic analysis which foregrounds the racialised colonial context in which it 
was produced and through which it acquires meaning.  
Making the Subject Legible 
The uniqueness of a signature and the impossibility of its authentic reproduction 
authorises the status of the signer as an autonomous subject within the discourse of 
Western liberalism. Here we can see a connection between the meaning of the word 
                                                           
36  Pugliese (forthcoming). 
37  Kidd (2007), pp 23–24. 
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‘character’ as a ‘stamped impression’, as in a system of writing, and the notion of 
‘having a self’.38 Character is that which distinguishes one individual from another 
and refers to moral constitution or status. The authority to sign a document is 
regarded within the post-Enlightenment philosophical tradition as a function of the 
free and self-determined, reasoning subject. It is closely connected to the capacity 
to make moral judgments, to act within the law and to consent to actions. At the 
time the form of consent was purported to have been signed, however, thumbprints 
were not read as individualised identity. On the contrary, the thumbprint signified 
membership of an illiterate group; it was inscribed with collective identity and in 
this way the uniqueness of the event is undermined.  
The concept of individualised identity and subjectivity is itself tied to the 
emergence of the modern bureaucratic state and the development of documentary 
practices which made citizens visible and ‘open to the scrutiny of officialdom’.39 
One of the key functions of the emergence of written forms of individualised 
identification in Western Europe was as a means to record real property ownership, 
inheritance and exchange through contracts, wills and estates. These are legal 
documents on which the signatures of parties and testators function as the sign of 
agreement, obligation or receipt, whose authentic identity is subsequently verified 
by a witness through another signature or mark. The semiotic function of the 
signature as the sign of individualised identity is inextricably connected to legal and 
bureaucratic processes of state control and land ownership. 
Scott and colleagues refer to this process of the production of legal identities as 
‘state projects of legibility’, a process they analyse through the historic 
development and imposition of the permanent family surname.40 The authors 
examine the function of fixed personal names, and particularly permanent 
patronyms, as legal identities carried out as state-making projects of the modern era, 
‘in which it was desirable to be able to distinguish individual (male) subjects’ for 
purposes such as ‘tax collection … conscription, land revenue, court judgments, 
witness records, and police work’.41 Pointing out that ‘[v]ernacular naming practices 
throughout much of the world are enormously rich and varied’ and ‘[i]n many 
cultures, an individual’s name will change from context to context and … over 
time’,42 they argue that ‘the use of inherited familial surnames represents a relatively 
recent phenomenon intricately linked to the aggrandisement of state control over 
individuals and the development of modern legal systems and property regimes’.43 
The deployment of the notion of legibility in the authors’ argument serves to 
illuminate the semantic function of colonial and other state-making naming 
practices in an attempt to inscribe meaning on contexts that are otherwise illegible 
to the colonialist: landscapes which seem inhospitable, people who appear 
unintelligible. It is an attempt to fix the meaning of the Indigenous Other according 
                                                           
38  Connor (2001). 
39  Caplin and Torpey (2001), p 1. 
40  Scott et al (2002). 
41  Scott et al (2002), p 11. 
42  Scott et al (2002), p 7. 
43  Scott et al (2002), p 6.  
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to the known and privileged discursive, legal and administrative paradigm of the 
colonial ruler. As Scott and colleagues point out, the production of legal identities is 
symptomatic of the desire for ‘synoptic, standardized knowledge’,44 and the drive to 
make subjects legible to the bureaucratic regime. 
The form of consent was a pro forma document on which the names of Gunner 
and Kundrilba were inscribed, bureaucratically inserted into the colonial legal 
framework and racially defined according to an assimilationist and eugenicist 
discourse. The name ‘Topsy’ is itself symptomatic of colonial naming practices, 
and was most likely attached to Kundrilba at some point when she had contact with 
the bureaucratic processes of the Native Affairs Department or when she began 
working as a domestic servant. It is resonant with colonial notions of femininity: 
diminutive and familiar. It is not the name she would have been known by in her 
own family network. Gunner gave evidence that before he was taken away he used 
Aboriginal names for the members of his family group,45 and that he never used his 
mother’s European name.46 In the trial, Gunner and Cubillo argued that their names 
had been stolen from them, as part of the theft of their language, culture and 
relationships with their families. As so many members of the Stolen Generations 
have testified, the loss of one’s name is also the loss of cultural knowledge, identity 
in terms of skin and kinship relationships, the law governing who one is permitted 
to marry and the means to retracing these connections; it is the loss of this 
subjectivity.   
Gunner’s experience readily illustrates the colonial production of legible 
subjects and of patronymic legal identity. He said that he had been ‘given’ his 
name, the name of his purported father — literally the patronym — when he 
became an inmate of the institution of St Mary’s Hostel. Of course, this would not 
have been the name he was known by in his family before he was taken away. The 
imposition of the name of his presumed father was a function of colonial 
bureaucratic administration, an attempt to make the child legible to the state. As 
Gunner pointed out, it was also at St Mary’s that he was given a date of birth,47 
another important example of hegemonic state-naming identity practices. The date 
of birth given to Gunner when he was admitted to St Mary’s was recorded on a 
birth certificate, produced some 10 years after he was born, and also containing the 
purported thumbprint of Kundrilba.48 In this way, a documentary record and legal 
identity were created in order to facilitate removal and incarceration.  
In the Western legal tradition, patrilineal naming practices serve to authorise 
an individual’s agency in the law. Indeed, in order to launch a legal action at all, it 
is necessary to be able to state, under oath, one’s name and date of birth. Gunner 
was inscribed with the name of the white father, emblematic of the logic of 
                                                           
44  Scott et al (2002), p 5. 
45  Transcript, 16 August 1999, pp 1496–97. 
46  Transcript, 16 August 1999, p 1503. 
47  Transcript, 17 August 1999, p 1519.  
48  Exhibit R93, Peter Gunner’s birth certificate, giving his date of birth as 19 September 
1948. The court did not attempt to verify if the thumbprints on the two documents were 
the same. However, as they appear to have been produced at the same time, and for the 
same purpose, I would extend my argument to the birth certificate.  
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assimilation. This naming was an attempt to displace the child of mixed-race 
parentage’s Indigenous identity and specificity of kinship relations evidenced in the 
name — the only identity previously known to Gunner — and replace it with an 
identity which conformed to the white Australian normative patriarchal order. This 
is despite the fact that Gunner’s biological paternity was actually unknown to him 
and subsequently revealed to be uncertain.49 Gunner’s apparent indifference to 
accurate ‘biological’ knowledge of his paternity flies in the face of the evident 
preoccupation on the part of the colonial administration and the mission, and 
subsequently the law, with the identity of his father as the foundation for production 
of his legal and racial identity.  
The Body at the Scene of Writing50 
A signature is considered to be a unique identifying mark, yet it does not carry the 
trace of racial identity. In the context of the form of consent on which Kundrilba is 
said to have placed her thumbprint, however, the presence of race relations is 
unmistakable. Signs are produced by the body. A thumbprint is the trace of the 
body at the scene of writing. In this case, it is the sign of indigeneity, the trace of 
colonial violence, dispossession and genocide.  
Had Kundrilba signed her name cursively, rather than with the sign of her 
body, what might this have signified? The thumbprint is itself a sign of illiteracy. In 
Western culture, illiteracy is considered a sign of ignorance and is associated with 
incompetence and with the uncivilised. The form itself explicitly states that the 
signer, a ‘full-blood aboriginal (female) within the meaning of the Aboriginals 
Ordinance 1918–1953’, desires ‘my son to be educated and trained in accordance 
with accepted European standards, to which he is entitled by reason of his caste’ 
and that she was ‘unable myself to provide the means by which my son may derive 
the benefits of a standard European education’. The discursive framework in which 
the form circulated was eugenicist, relying on a presupposition that Aboriginal 
women were incapable of providing the parental care and educational opportunities 
to which a boy such as Gunner was entitled, by virtue of the status of his ‘Part-
European blood, his father being a European’. Under the legislative regime in force 
at the time, Gunner was of a different caste to his mother. Whiteness, with which he 
was inscribed as a ramification of his white paternity, made him, producing him as 
a subject entitled to an education, and to other rights seen to be part of the civilising 
project of assimilation.  
Van Krieken points out that: ‘Civilization was colonialism’s most central 
organizing concept, quintessentially what imperialism and the colonial project was 
meant to achieve.’51 He argues that the failure of the earlier colonial strategy of 
relegating Aborigines into the category of barbaric ‘Other’, as represented by the 
increasing population of mixed-race people, ‘threatened the very boundaries and 
                                                           
49  Expert witness Dr John Morton provided evidence that Gunner’s father might have been 
either a white station worker called Gunner or Sid Kunoth, the son of the Utopia Station 
owners at the end of World War I: Anthropologist’s Report re Gunner v the 
Commonwealth of Australia (21 June 1999), p 15. 
50  I have appropriated this expression from Kirby (1991). 
51  Van Krieken (1999), p 299. 
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character of civilization itself’.52 The response to this was a ‘civilizing offensive’ 
involving both a legislative regime concerned with the ‘protection’ of Aboriginal 
people, including the separation of ‘half-caste’ and ‘full-blood’ Aborigines, and the 
removal of ‘half-caste’ Aboriginal children through the assumption of legal 
guardianship by the state. 
Using this framework, we can see that the form of consent was part of the legal 
armoury of bureaucratic governance under which Indigenous people were made 
visible to the colonial state. Aboriginal children of mixed descent were kidnapped 
from their families and taken to institutions in order to be inculcated in white social 
behaviour and Christian religious practices, a project of ‘civilising and 
Christianising’, and to create a servile labour force. While Aboriginal people were 
not accorded the rights of citizenship, the administrative regime apparently made 
provision for a sufficient level of agency such that a mother was accorded the 
sovereign power to consent to the removal of her child.  
Paradoxically, despite the judicial attention to the form of consent, 
O’Loughlin J actually found that, ‘although every consideration was to be given to 
the mother’s feelings and to her wishes, ultimately, her consent was not required to 
her child’s removal’.53 The judge came to this conclusion citing the legislative 
regime in force at the time, under which the Director of Native Affairs had the 
statutory power to remove children into custody if it was considered in their best 
interests, irrespective of whether they had a parent,54 and the High Court’s 
interpretation of the legislation as having been beneficial and protectionist.55 As the 
test case for claims of liability made by members of the Stolen Generations against 
the Commonwealth government, the Cubillo decision established a precedent which 
affirmed the law’s resistance to according responsibility for the detrimental effects 
of generational child abduction.56 The recourse to legal positivism was supported by 
the ‘[l]ine of documents that were compiled in the Native Affairs Branch’, which 
the judge found on the balance of probabilities ‘favours a positive conclusion that 
Topsy gave her informed consent to her son going to St Mary’s’.57  
Conclusion: Responsibility Before the Law 
In his reading of the form of consent, O’Loughlin J relies upon an understanding of 
the thumbprint as a signature, and therefore as the performance of a speech act 
which communicates the intention of the speaker. It is an attempt to attribute to it 
the power to provide a transparent window on the truth and to invest in the mark of 
                                                           
52  Van Krieken (1999), p 305. 
53  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 195.  
54  Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (NT), ss 6, 7 and Welfare Ordinance 1953 (NT), s 17.  
55  Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
56  However, in the first — and to date only — successful action by a member of the Stolen 
Generations, Bruce Trevorrow succeeded in his claim against the South Australian 
government, winning $525,000 in compensation for having been removed from his 
mother’s care in 1957 when he was 13 months old: Trevorrow v State of South Australia 
(No 5) [2007] SASC 285. Tragically, Trevorrow died in June 2008, aged 51. 
57  Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 344. 
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her body the function of writing. However, I have argued that the form of consent 
tells us nothing about intention and cannot be used as evidence of consent. Rather, 
the form of consent was an agent of a disciplinary regime functioning to produce 
racialised subjectivity which conformed to normative white patriarchal order. It 
served to interpellate Gunner as subject of the law, while affirming the lawfulness 
to his removal by deploying the thumbprint as evidence of his mother’s illiterate 
and disenfranchised status. Rather than indicating consent, the thumbprint is 
evidence of both Kundrilba and her son’s subjection before the law.  
As Kevin Rudd stated in his National Apology speech: ‘The uncomfortable 
truth for us all is that the parliaments of the nation, individually and collectively, 
enacted statutes and delegated authority under those statutes that made the forced 
removal of children on racial grounds fully lawful.’58 While Rudd was careful not to 
refer at any stage to the question of compensation to the Stolen Generations, his 
speech took the government a step closer to recognition of responsibility. The 
question of responsibility goes to the heart of the Cubillo and Gunner case, and the 
practice of Indigenous child removal raises crucial questions about collective 
responsibility for the impact of colonialism. It concerns the relationship between the 
past and the present, the responsibility of white Australians for the actions of our 
forbears and our racial and cultural identity. As Derrida and others have asserted, 
the concept of responsibility presents a particular difficulty because of the way it 
extends beyond our own individual actions and because the memories of the past 
imbue our culture, language and ways of life — and because, as Derrida argues in 
the context of a colonial history, settler Australians have a particular responsibility 
since we continue to derive benefit from the original violence of colonisation.59 We 
are yet to see whether the law will now be able to act responsibly in offering ‘fresh’ 
judgment, by judging in the present with reference to contemporary standards of 
justice. 
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